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Abstract—The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is set to be one of
the most disruptive technology paradigms since the advent of
the Internet itself. Market research company Gartner estimates
that around 4.9 billion connected things will be in use in 2015,
and around 25 billion by 2020. While there are substantial
opportunities accompanying IoT, spanning from Healthcare to
Energy, there are an equal number of concerns regarding the
security and privacy of this plethora of ubiquitous devices. In
this position paper we approach security and privacy in IoT
from a different perspective to existing research, by considering
the impact that IoT may have on the growing problem of insider
threat within enterprises. Our specific aim is to explore the extent
to which IoT may exacerbate the insider-threat challenge for
organisations and overview the range of new and adapted attack
vectors. Here, we focus especially on (personal) devices which
insiders bring and use within their employer’s enterprise. As
a start to addressing these issues, we outline a broad research
agenda to encourage further research in this area.
Index Terms—Internet-of-things security; smart devices; wear-
ables; insider threat; enterprise attack vectors; research agenda
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology features in every part of our lives, from tasks
at work and social activities at home to supporting large
industries and governments. In effect, technology drives our
world. Over recent years, there have been several significant
advances in technology ranging from the Internet and the
Web, to the diffusion of connected mobile devices on a
substantial scale. Today estimates suggest that there are around
14.3 trillion pages online serving billions of users across a
similar number of devices spanning the globe [1]. It is this
idea of Internet-connected devices that has given rise to the
grander idea of the Internet-of-Things. The Internet-of-Things
(IoT) is a technology paradigm aiming towards increasing the
connectivity of everyday devices [2]. The difference with IoT
as compared to previous incarnations (e.g., ubiquitous comput-
ing) is that the technologies themselves and the accompanying
data science have matured to a point where the vision is
fast becoming a reality. There are now intended applications
in Energy with the creation of smart grids, Manufacturing
towards smarter production and assembly lines, Healthcare to
facilitate enhanced monitoring and treatment, and Buildings in
the creation of smart homes, offices and cities [3, 4].
As the IoT has increased in popularity, so too has the
emphasis on its security and privacy in research and practice.
There have been numerous articles outlining the key concerns
and challenges across the spectrum of IoT components (e.g.,
sensors, embedded chips, wireless communication systems,
etc.), some with proposals for potential solutions [5–7]. Re-
flecting on these and other articles, it is evident that there
is an overwhelming emphasis on protecting devices and their
communications from unauthorised access, hacking and ex-
posure of sensitive information to external malicious parties.
In contrast, there is little deliberation on the potential attacks
from insiders within a system (e.g., an organisation), and the
harm that they might intentionally or inadvertently cause.
Insider threats occur when individuals within an organ-
isation misuse their privileged access to cause a negative
impact on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the
organisations’ systems [8]. The seriousness of the threat from
insiders is well known and has been documented in several
real-world cases and explored extensively in research [8–10].
We believe that this threat has the potential to become sig-
nificantly more challenging for organisations to manage in a
world of IoT, where everything is a device that may be used to
access, store and share sensitive company data; this is a belief
shared by many others [11]. In some sense, all devices can be
‘insiders’ as the traditional perimeters are now so nebulous that
it makes little sense not to consider everything as potentially
having authorised access. This fact makes understanding how
to manage the risk emanating from insiders in IoT environ-
ments exceptionally important. Unfortunately, at this point
little detailed analysis of this risk has been conducted.
The aim of this paper is therefore to begin a critical, aca-
demic discussion on the adapted threat that insiders may pose
in the context of IoT. We specifically seek to explore the extent
to which IoT may exacerbate the insider-threat challenge and
complicate detection approaches, by investigating the range of
attacks that may be possible with IoT devices used by insiders.
This research aims to focus on the current state of play but also
seeks to be forward-looking in considering emerging threats,
and thus, identifying areas for additional research.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II reflects on
the nature of IoT, with a focus on the general security and
privacy issues with this new technology. Next, Section III
examines the threat from insiders, including the state-of-the-
art in current research. Section IV builds on the work in the
previous sections and aims to explore how IoT, and particularly
personal IoT devices used by insiders, may exacerbate the
insider-threat challenge. In Section V we consider the range of
To be published in the International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things 2015 (SIoT 2015) in conjunction with the European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2015).
attack vectors enabled and those made much easier for insiders
through the use of IoT devices. We present a brief research
agenda in Section VI to identify areas for future work, before
concluding in Section VII.
II. THE INTERNET-OF-THINGS AND SECURITY AND
PRIVACY
A. The IoT paradigm
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) can be defined as a networked
infrastructure composed of billions of identifiable ‘things’
interacting and communicating with each other to achieve
common goals. Today this is a growing reality through the
integration of several enabling technologies [2, 12], which
can be classified in three layers: hardware, middleware and
application. The hardware layer is composed of all the phys-
ical devices present on the network. Some examples are
wearable technology, smartphones, sensors and devices with
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, and wireless (e.g.,
Bluetooth, ZigBee, WiFi) connections. These devices can all
be characterised in three working processes: identification,
sensors and communication. While the application layer is the
software used to visualise, interpret or process the necessary
data, the middleware is an intermediate software layer that
bridges hardware and applications. Middleware has the crucial
role of facilitating the implementation of new software and
services without much concern as to the hardware that is used
at the lower layers.
Although there has been significant work in these enabling
layers, there is still a large amount of research and develop-
ment in progress to enable more effective use and broader
adoption of IoT. One of the key challenges at this point is
achieving high interoperability between devices; a difficulty
due to the high level of device heterogeneity. Moreover,
because of the constrained resources of these devices, there
are a number of new security and privacy challenges as will
be discussed below.
B. Security and privacy issues
The unique nature of IoT with numerous devices of limited
capabilities (processing, power and memory constraints) con-
stantly interacting, makes IoT especially vulnerable to attacks.
Devices are susceptible to physical attacks if protection is
not provided, regardless of whether this is due to economic
reasons, device limitations or carelessness [13]. Remote sen-
sors without protection, unlocked devices (e.g., smartphones),
unsecure communications or removable media (e.g., camera
card) are just a few examples.
Along with the intensive network communications neces-
sary with IoT come conventional Internet security and privacy
problems. These are accentuated by the fact that IoT devices
tend to implement less secure primitives due to their capability
constraints. An example is the use of insecure remote login
methods [2]. Another concern is that secure and reliable
devices do not naturally result in a secure system. The process
of combining and configuring the interactions between devices
and resulting systems also has a bearing on security. This is
particularly important in IoT where devices can often switch
between host networks. In what follows, we reflect on a few
of the major security and privacy issues in IoT.
1) Security: Security in IoT relies on many different fac-
tors, but in particular, considers maintaining the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of systems and data [6].
Confidentiality in IoT, much like general information se-
curity, refers to the creation of a private channel of com-
munication between devices. The major difference with the
IoT paradigm is the limited resources on devices affecting
their ability to implement standard cryptographic protocols. To
address this problem, a number of Key Management Systems
protocols and security frameworks have been proposed [14].
Unfortunately, their acceptance has been very limited and
as such, there are continued calls for further, more applied
research in this area [5].
Maintaining the integrity of data, IoT services and devices
requires mechanisms which prevent the modification of data,
whether it be on the device or during communications. Solu-
tions proposed for device and data integrity include secure
boot and the creation of access control policies referring
to trusted identities and credentials [7]. For data in transit,
traditional mechanisms to prevent attacks (such as man-in-
the-middle) could be used, but the challenge here is when
devices broadcast information without partnering devices (e.g.,
sensors network), and the attacks that could accompany such
communications [6].
Finally, IoT services must be available when called upon by
authorised parties. This includes ensuring that communication
channels are protected, and IoT devices and services are re-
sistant to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. A common solution
to prevent abuse is the use of authentication mechanisms
associated with usage quotas. However, the ad-hoc nature of
IoT makes it essential to provide authentication mechanisms
able to create trust when devices have no previous knowledge
of each other and the services that may be on offer [15].
Compromised IoT devices can also be a serious problem as
they can be used to launch DoS attacks against wider systems
(e.g., attacks via smart home devices [16]).
2) Privacy: Privacy in IoT can be assured by giving people
and devices control over the data they generate. This scenario
is feasible in a decentralised topology, where devices are
likely to have control over their own data and share this
with other devices they trust. In centralised scenarios where
a single device manages the data, trust will typically only
need to be placed in that entity to maintain data privacy.
Another significant challenge which IoT creates is that of
unwanted tracking and monitoring [5]. Surveillance, even
from individuals or organisations, becomes a real issue and
potentially one that could threaten not only privacy but an
individual’s well-being (e.g., connected health devices). There
is also the issue of user and usage profiling threats and their
impact on an individual’s privacy. A subset of these issues has
been considered in existing research, with some articles (e.g.,
[17,18]) proposing new privacy models to support broader IoT
concepts such as smart cities.
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III. THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN INSIDER THREAT
A. Scoping the insider-threat problem
Insider threat is an ever-growing problem for organisations.
The in-depth knowledge that insiders possess of the security
practices and monitoring policies, places organisations in dire
situations if these attacks are executed. As such, detecting
insiders is a significant challenge, and one which has at-
tracted the interest of researchers for over a decade. Insightful
discourses have been ranging from recognising elements in
attacks [10] and identifying behavioural factors [19], to the
detection of anomalies indicative of suspicious and malicious
insider activity [19, 20].
A pioneering effort to assess insider attacks was the CMU-
CERT Insider Threat project [10]. They classified insider
threats into four categories, namely sabotage, Intellectual
Property (IP) theft, data and financial fraud, and espionage.
Using System Dynamics as a framework, they identified and
described ‘critical paths’ which most insiders follow in a series
of MERIT (Management and Education of the Risk of Insider
Threat) models, isolating suspicious behaviour. In addition,
they distinguished between insiders who act maliciously and
those who facilitate an attack unintentionally or expose their
organisation to unnecessary risk, either by violating policies
(to facilitate their daily activities) to or by being careless
(victims of phishing attacks) [21].
Similar frameworks elaborate on factors which may be
considered as precursors of an attack, by focusing on ca-
pability, motivation and opportunity as key attributes of an
insider threat [9], or by examining attributes related to the
organisation and environment [22]. We have also contributed
to this discussion by developing a framework to capture
the full insider-threat spectrum. Our framework defines why
insiders attack (catalysts, motivations, personality aspects),
behaviours indicative of a current or impending attack (both
physical and cyber), and core assets and vulnerabilities which
are usually exploited in these attacks [8].
B. Reflecting on current detection research
A different strand of research has focused on developing
systems to detect insider attacks. For instance, researchers
have explored data from organisations’ databases regarding
activities on employees’ laptops [23]. They applied seventeen
different algorithms for anomaly detection, which were ad-
justed on recognising well-established malicious behaviour,
to identify if these techniques were efficient in capturing
inside activity. In addition, they provided a visual language
for illustrating features, baselines and peer groups relevant to
insider threat. In a similar vain, Eldardiry et al. describe how
to extract features from employees’ activities and suggest a
detection system which processes these features to identify
deviations [24].
Parveen et al. detail an unsupervised learning algorithm
which develops a set of sequences from dynamic data streams
denoting insider-threat behaviour [25]. The unsupervised
learning techniques endeavour to define common behaviour
and provide the means to distinguish data streams containing
uncommon, thus potentially malicious behaviours. Chen et
al. [26] use similar unsupervised learning techniques to
identify insider threats. Their system processes information
from recorded access logs and performs statistical analysis to
calculate deviations of users’ activities.
Other frameworks have tried to incorporate psychological
and behavioural factors into anomaly detection algorithms.
Magklaras and Furnell [27] build profiles of users’ behaviour
and evaluate how these may determine the level of threat that
could arise from a particular insider. Legg et al. [28] describe
a three-tier alert system to indicate suspicious behaviours. The
first level of alerts detects violations on corporates’ policies,
the second level is based on calculating anomalies (i.e.,
values exceeding a certain threshold) in specific employees’
behaviours (e.g., login anomalies) by assessing more than one
hundred features, and the third level of alerts detects deviations
from the user’s normal profile.
The vast majority of the systems proposed today are driven
by the data available to perform anomaly detection. Thus, the
effectiveness of these systems is limited to specific types of in-
sider attacks and to particular aspects of network activity. The
mainstream datasets used analyse information on insider email
communication, file access logs and Web activity, and focus
primarily on workstations instead of data from portable de-
vices which could be connected to the network. Furthermore,
information from abstract models regarding the motivation
of the attackers and the behavioural aspects exhibited during
these attacks is not considered by detection systems, due to
challenges in linking cyber behaviour with personality traits.
To our knowledge, there is not a detection approach or system
which accommodates data generated from devices considered
part of IoT or incorporating data regarding insiders’ behaviour.
This is an interesting challenge given the uniqueness of attacks
possible with IoT (as enumerated below), and the large volume
of data generated via IoT devices which can have an impact on
the efficiency and applicability of current detection methods.
IV. THE CHALLENGE WITH IOT AND INSIDER THREATS
Thus far in this article, we have engaged in a state-of-
the-art review of two key aspects that impact organisations
today. From this analysis, it is clear that in both of these areas
there are still significant challenges to be addressed. In IoT,
research is in progress on everything from the standardisation
of protocols to the deployment of effective security measures.
Research on insider threats is much more advanced than in
IoT but as shown in Section III, how to adequately detect and
respond to attacks are still unsolved problems.
As we move into a world where IoT is a natural part
of people’s lives, businesses face a remarkable challenge
in understanding and addressing the associated risks and
protecting themselves from the range of new insider attacks
(malicious and unintentional). The novelty of these attacks is
not what they target, but rather, the ease with which they can
be launched and through the use of devices likely unknown,
To be published in the International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things 2015 (SIoT 2015) in conjunction with the European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2015).
possibly undetectable, and certainly unmanaged by the enter-
prise. Here, and for the remainder of this section, we scope
our work especially to personal IoT devices such as wearables
(e.g., smart-watches, smart-glasses, activity trackers) and smart
devices including phones, displays and pens. These are largely
unexplored areas in terms of insider attacks and as such,
deserve more academic and industrial emphasis.
In examining the challenge of IoT use in organisations, it
would be prudent to consider other similar paradigms and the
impact that they have had on enterprises. One such paradigm
is Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). BYOD represented a
fundamental shift in corporate computing where employees
were allowed, and even encouraged, to bring their personal
devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, smartphones) to the workplace
and use them for work activities including accessing company
systems, files and data [29]. The main driving forces of
BYOD from an enterprise perspective are cost and efficiency.
Specifically, employers could provide less office technology,
while also benefiting from the newer, likely more feature-rich
personal devices that are with employees at work and at home.
Since its inception however, BYOD has been plagued with
several challenges, particularly as it pertains to the security of
enterprise systems and data, and the privacy of individual’s
personal information [30]. Data leakage (via stolen, lost or
compromised devices), malware (i.e., compromised personal
devices infecting corporate networks) and distributed denial-
of-service (DDOS) attacks are three of the main insider-
threat concerns for organisations. In response to this risk,
companies have introduced a range of BYOD policies, and
where possible, backed them with Mobile Device Manage-
ment (MDM) solutions capable of remote device management
(including functions such as compartmentalisation of sensitive
data and remote data wipe). Nonetheless, even with these
strategies in place, reports highlight that current employee
behaviour (whether accidental or intentional) still significantly
contributes to the struggle enterprise IT has in dealing with
BYOD [31,32].
In terms of the use of IoT within organisations, unfortu-
nately there are numerous of the same security and privacy
challenges faced by BYOD, but fewer of the advantages. One
of the main reasons for this was mentioned in Section II and
relates to the fact that a vast majority of these devices have
limited processing and storage capabilities, thus making them
not ideal for typical work-related tasks. They can however, be
compromised in the same way as BYOD, especially consid-
ering their constrained security setups [33, 34]. Furthermore,
as some of them can connect to the network (e.g., Google
Glass, Samsung Gear S smart-watch, Livescribe WiFi smart-
pen), they could be capable of infecting corporate servers, or
being used as an insider-based platform for further attacks.
The challenge with IoT is exacerbated by the number and
variety of devices that will enter the enterprise, many of which
employees will attempt to connect (directly or indirectly)
to the corporate network to maintain Internet connectivity.
From a malicious insider perspective, these devices provide
yet another pathway to attack, and one which is arguably
much harder for organisations to detect. This is a concerning
factor given that detection on existing systems is not a solved
problem [8, 10], and to our knowledge there are no detection
systems which accommodate for data generated from IoT
devices. The added difficulty with IoT could also be attributed
to the wide variety of these devices — any ‘thing’ might
be connected next — and the fact that due to advances in
technology, these devices can often be easily and discretely
concealed (e.g., smart-pens, life-logging cameras).
To consider the unintentional insider threat and situations
such as lost, stolen or compromised devices, MDM-type
solutions for IoT might seem ideal. However, given (a) the
limitations in processing power of these devices and (b) the
privacy concerns surrounding monitoring data on these highly
personal devices (i.e., wearables and smart systems), such
solutions are likely to be generally infeasible. Moreover, if
Gartner is to be believed, a notable number of organisational
BYOD policies will fail over the next few years due to MDM
solutions that are too restrictive and not accommodating to
employees’ privacy requirements and general needs [35].
Thus far we have outlined the challenge facing the use of
IoT within organisations and how such use could facilitate
insider threats. Next, we introduce the attack vectors and the
context surrounding attacks, followed by a detailed presenta-
tion of some of these vectors (including initial thoughts about
mapping such vectors to existing attack taxonomies [36]) and
case examples of their exploitation.
V. UNDERSTANDING AND DEFINING THE ATTACK VECTORS
A. Introducing attack vectors and the context of attacks
An attack vector defines the means through which a threat
may compromise the security of a system or its data. As a first
step to protecting a system, it is advantageous to understand
the vectors of attack and their context (e.g., what is the asset
being threatened, what might be the impact of the attack).
To define these aspects and structure our analysis, we apply
the A4 modelling approach used by VERIS to describe cyber
incidents [37]. This approach considers four key As in defining
attacks, namely assets, actors, attributes, and actions.
Assets are items of value to an enterprise, and can include
data (e.g., company files, client or supplier records, business
plans, source code), IP, systems and hardware, personnel and
even the reputation of the organisation. Any of these could
be affected either directly or indirectly by an attack. Actors
define the individuals that launch the attack against the asset.
As discussed in Section III, there are two broad types of actor:
the malicious insider and the unintentional insider. Both of
these entities can have a significant impact on the enterprise.
Attributes capture the impact of the attack on the asset.
There are at least 5 areas of interest here: data access,
data exfiltration, data leakage, system sabotage and reputation
or employee harm. These areas can be associated with the
high-level goals of an insider, i.e., sabotage, IP theft, fraud,
and espionage. For instance, an insider may steal sensitive
company data and share with an outsider for a financial sum,
thus committing IP theft. Actions specify the steps involved
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in attacking an asset. A combination of these steps constitutes
the insider-attack vector. It is important to note that not all of
the actions involved might be malevolent, and often it is the
last step which truly identifies the attack.
The first three of these areas (or As) provide useful context
for an attack (which is defined in the fourth area). In particular,
they help an organisation to understand and model key details
about the perpetrators of the attack (and their motives), identify
the assets affected and assess the impact of the attack.
B. Defining attack vectors
There has been a notable amount of isolated research on
attack vectors in IoT ([7]) and within insider threat ([10]).
There is little academic analysis or thought however, on cases
where personal IoT devices can be used to craft novel and
hard to detect insider attacks. Our aim here is to define and
present several forms of attack, with the overarching goal of
drawing attention to the real challenges that enterprises (will)
face as consumer technology permeates the workplace.
The number of personal IoT devices used within enterprises
via employees with wearables or smart devices is constantly
growing. A preliminary list of such devices includes: smart-
phones, tablets, smart-glasses, smart-watches, smart-pens, ac-
tivity trackers, life-logging devices and apps, and smart-
displays; smart-contact lenses may also be on the way [38].
Although different devices, they all overlap in functionality.
For instance, smart-glasses and smartphones have cameras
that can take pictures and record video. Our attack vectors,
of which we only present a few of the most salient ones
here, are therefore structured around the features these devices
have rather than the devices themselves. Below, we present the
vectors according to the broad types of attacker; it should be
noted however, that depending on the specific scenario these
may vary. We then briefly consider these vectors in the context
of existing attack taxonomies.
Attack vectors (AV) of malicious insiders (MI)
MI-AV1: Using a smart-device camera, the insider discretely
takes a video of another employee entering their login cre-
dentials into a system and then subsequently analyses the
video to determine those details. This is a variation on the
traditional shoulder-surfing attack. A semi-automated version
of this attack using IoT devices can be seen in [39]. [Applies
to any device with a camera.]
MI-AV2: Using a smart-device camera, the insider discretely
takes a photo or video of sensitive organisational data or IP and
then intentionally shares it with a third-party (e.g., competitor
or nation state). This sharing could also be in the context
of the insider taking this data with them to a new job in
another organisation. The real issue with such an attack is that
it offers an effective alternative to techniques such as email-
based data exfiltration (likely to be detected by firewalls) or
data copying via external drives (detectable by most anomaly
detection systems). [Applies to any device with a camera.]
MI-AV3: Using the audio recorder on a smart device, the
insider discretely records a private conversation or meeting
with a colleague, collaborator, supervisor or business partner,
and uses it later to blackmail them into assisting in a more
comprehensive attack (e.g., sabotaging a system via planting
a logic bomb, where the coerced employee helps cover tracks).
Alternately, the insider may choose to leak the recording
immediately to a third-party (e.g., a competitor or the media).
[Applies to any device with an audio recorder.]
MI-AV4: Using the storage system on a smart device, the
insider is able to copy sensitive data (e.g., IP or files) from
the organisation’s computers to the device and remove it from
the enterprise. Bluetooth or NFC may be preferred for this
attack as organisations now tend to monitor USB connections.
[Applies to any device with a storage capability.]
MI-AV5: Using a smart device, the insider discretely scans
sensitive items (e.g., contactless ID or bank cards) belonging to
the organisation’s customers or suppliers during a transaction.
Through this scanning, the insider is able to skim sensitive
data about the individual (e.g., card numbers or names) which
could then be taken out of the enterprise, potentially being sold
to a third party. Performing this task is not trivial, but research
has shown that it is possible [40, 41]. [Applies to any device
with a device scanner (e.g., NFC) and storage capability.]
MI-AV6: Using a smart device infected with malware (e.g.,
virus, backdoor, or trojan), the insider connects (e.g., using
USB, Bluetooth, NFC or WiFi) to the organisation’s network
or computer infrastructure. The aim could be to infect the
enterprise and set the foundation for a later attack either
intentionally or unintentionally in the case where the insider
is more focused on another task (e.g., charging their device)
or assumes the infection will not spread to the network. Both
cases result could in system sabotage (e.g., deleting computer
files) or unauthorised access (e.g., a backdoor to access
sensitive corporate files or intellectual property). [Applies to
any device with a storage capability.]
MI-AV7: The insider creates/configures a smart device able to
be used as a hardware-based backdoor into the organisation.
They then disguise the device and secretly bring it into the
organisation where it is installed and setup on the corporate
network. This backdoor could be the platform for more di-
rected attacks including passively collecting data or planting
malicious scripts. A real example of how a smart device could
be used as physical backdoor to office networks can be seen
in [42]; this could help to adapt similar current attacks (e.g.,
insider KVM attacks [43]) and add a level of sophistication
which makes them more difficult to detect. [Applies to any
device capable of acting as an access point.]
MI-AV8: Using a smart device with a network analysis
application installed, the insider connects to the WiFi net-
work and then engages in full-scale, unauthorised network
reconnaissance. This includes identifying the devices on the
network (with MAC addresses and manufacturers), monitoring
individual device connections to the network, scanning the
devices for open ports, and pinging devices. The insider could
use this data in an attempt to compromise specific devices
or disrupt their services, or leak the data online for anyone
to view. One existing and freely available network analysis
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application is Fing - Network Tools [44]. [Applies to any
device with capable of polling a network.]
Attack vectors caused by unintentional insiders (UI)
UI-AV1: Using a smart-device camera, the insider takes a
photo or video of sensitive enterprise data or IP to use to
work remotely, and then shares it with a third-party host (e.g.,
Google or Dropbox). This third-party account is then breached
by a malicious entity resulting in the sensitive data being
exposed. [Applies to any device with a camera.]
UI-AV2: Using a smart-device camera, the insider takes a
photo or video of the office space, which unknown to them
contains sensitive information (e.g., login details on a white-
board – such as the case in [45]), and they then share it
publicly (e.g., on social media). [Applies to any device with a
camera.]
UI-AV3: An improperly configured or inadequately protected
smart device is compromised by a malicious third-party, who
then use the device’s camera to view potentially sensitive
information (including documents or meetings) and to spy on
company employees. There are examples of how such attacks
might be launched on devices such as Smart TVs with web
cameras and Google Glass [46,47]. [Applies to any device with
a camera.]
UI-AV4: Through accident or inability to properly use a smart
device, the insider activates an audio feature (such as Siri or
Google Now) which records part of a sensitive conversation
and thus, exposes enterprise data to a third-party (Apple or
Google in this case). If this third-party was to pass on this
data (e.g., to an advertising agency) or the user’s account was
compromised (such data is typically saved in search logs), this
sensitive data would be shared even more widely. [Applies to
any device with a camera.]
UI-AV5: An improperly configured or inadequately protected
smart device is compromised by a malicious third-party, who
then accesses company data (e.g., emails, work calendars)
cached on the device. Two variations on this attack include: (1)
the third-party infecting the smart device and then using that
device once inside the organisation to infect other devices; and
(2) through hacking of smart devices which facilitate payments
(e.g., via CurrentC or Apple Pay), an external attacker is
able to steal company credit card details or make illegitimate
charges. Regarding the latter point, some of these services
have already been hacked, while there are concerns about the
security of the others [48, 49]. [Applies to any device with a
storage (or data entry or payment) capability.]
UI-AV6: Assume that an attacker was able to compromise
an insider’s improperly configured or inadequately protected
location-tracking smart device (e.g, Garmin smart-watch) ac-
count and access the GPS or route logs. They could use this in-
formation to make inferences about potential company clients
and suppliers, or prospective business partnerships (based on
places visited by the individual). This knowledge may then
be exposed with the aim of sabotaging such relationships or
selling it to a competing company. [Applies to any device with
a location tracker.]
UI-AV7: As a result of improperly configured or inadequately
protected insider smart devices (e.g., a smart-watch and a
paired smartphone), the communications channel between
them is compromised by a malicious third-party. This party
then gathers enterprise data via the notifications, schedules,
messages synchronised across devices. Further detail on such
attacks on wearables can be found in [50]. We note that this
attack could be conducted by another insider as well. [Applies
to any device with a notification and storage capability.]
UI-AV8: The theft, loss or exploitation of a smart ID device
(potentially one issued by the company or a personal one
granted with special permissions) used to access organisational
data, office rooms, building facilities or property. In the case
of theft or exploitation, this could be an attack launched
by an external party aiming to gain unauthorised access to
the enterprise, or by a malicious insider. An example of a
related real-world attack which exploits the authentication
mechanisms in smart devices and property can be viewed in
[51]. [Applies to any device with an access capability.]
In addition to identifying various forms of attack, we con-
ducted a preliminary investigation into the ability of existing
attack taxonomies to model these threats. One of the main
reasons for this was to determine whether pursuing a new
taxonomy might be necessary, i.e., helpful in defining the in-
sider threat IoT problem. Amongst the taxonomies considered,
Howard and Longstaff’s [36] was one of the most promising
and this was ideal given its reputation. Their taxonomy identi-
fies several key aspects that form a part of an attack (incident)
including: Tools used, Vulnerabilities exploited, Actions taken,
Assets targeted, and Unauthorised results. The real benefit of
their model is in its encompassing nature at both the aspect
and aspect-category level. This was such that for the most
of the aspects, a number of their existing categories could
apply, or be adapted to model insider IoT attacks. For instance,
autonomous agents or malware can be launched (via an IoT
device) to exploit some system configuration weakness in an
enterprise system which leads to data being stolen.
There were some modifications necessary however, to be
able to directly apply Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy to
define insider IoT attacks. For the Tool aspect for instance,
the existing categories (namely, physical attack, information
exchange, user command, script, autonomous agent, toolkit,
distributed tool or data tap) were unable to capture the range
of attack means capable with IoT devices. We therefore added
a new category called ‘physical device functionality’, with
the sub-categories: camera, audio recorder, storage system,
device scanner, network scanner, access point, and location
tracker. Moreover, for the Actions aspect which possessed
typical attack categories including scan, flood, read, steal
and delete, we added a ‘record’ category. This category had
picture taking, video recording and audio recording, as its
main sub-categories; therefore, directly allowing many of the
attack vectors enumerated above. For the Assets targeted
aspect, the existing taxonomy was largely adequate, and as
such we made only two additions to the categories, namely,
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‘personnel’ and ‘events’ (e.g., meetings). These would allow
for the consideration and modelling of intangibles (e.g., the
secret recording of a private meeting using an IoT device) not
considered in some attack assessments.
Through the modifications presented above, we were able
to engage in an initial adaptation of an existing model for the
purposes of creating a draft taxonomy, which is broad enough
to capture insider IoT attacks. While this is a promising start,
we must stress that this is preliminary work and will need to
be assessed and evaluated in greater detail in future research.
As more is understood about these attack vectors, this will
lead to a more complete taxonomy, which in turn should lead
to better detection approaches targeting these attacks.
C. Case studies of the attacks applied and the enterprise risk
This section builds on the research thus far, and presents
two examples of the contexts in which such attacks might
occur. These cover a malicious and an unintentional insider-
threat scenario. Here, we deliberately consider attacks using
current IoT devices to make this section more relatable, but
future IoT could lead to much more sophisticated attacks.
1) Case study 1: Employee blackmail: A junior IT staff
member for a small manufacturer was reprimanded by the
company CEO because of claims that he was verbally abusing
other employees. In reality, the CEO had an affair with
an employee that the insider had been flirting with. After
later discovering that he was likely to be dismissed, he
prepared a plan to get revenge. He had read a report a
few weeks earlier by the Bitdefender Research Team [52],
which discussed the fact that it was possible to sniff and
intercept the communication between a smart-watch and a
smartphone. This was perfect as the CEO recently purchased a
new smart-watch. The insider then used the report’s knowledge
and underground hacking forums to research how to collect
communications data, and find weaknesses in poor Bluetooth
encryption implementations that would allow access to the
information. Amongst the equipment purchased, the insider
even bought the same watch to trial the attacks. Once the
attack was prepared, the insider launched it against the CEO,
and was able to collect data on incoming phone calls, SMS and
emails, and general calendar information; these were of a work
and personal nature. Finally, the insider blackmailed the CEO
with the information collected (some of which highlighted his
affair), and threatened to share it with his wife and children
unless he was given a large severance package and promised
exemplary references.
Reflecting on the 4As for this case, there are: Assets: Sen-
sitive company and personal information; Actors: Malicious
insider; Attributes: Unauthorised data access then used for
blackmail and fraud; and Actions: Attack Vector – UI-AV7
(where an insider is the perpetrator). This case highlights a key
weakness in IoT devices, i.e., the limited security features with
these devices (as discussed in Section II) and a clever attack
building on personal knowledge helped by current reports and
malicious Web forums.
2) Case study 2: Malware infection: Sensitive company
IP and personal data about several senior managers of an
aeronautical firm was posted online. This led to damage in
the company’s reputation, a drop in its stock prices, and
embarrassment to the managers and their family members.
Upon investigation, the IT department of the enterprise dis-
covered that some of the work-provided smartphones of those
employees were infected by WireLurker and Mekie malware
[53]. These malware monitor and collect data from any iOS
device connected (via USB) to an infected OS X computer;
WireLurker in particular, also can install downloaded third-
party apps as well as automatically generated malicious ap-
plications onto the device. Given that the malware was found
on several phones, IT checked all of the computers in the
company and discovered that the computer in one of the
meeting rooms was the source of the infection. That computer
was extensively used by all managers to charge their phones
and was used as media control during client presentations as
well. A few managers even had allowed visitors to use the
computer. IT concluded that one of the visitors may have
placed the malware onto the machine and could be responsible
for the attack (deliberate or not) and subsequent data leakage.
The 4As for this case are: Assets: Sensitive company IP
and personal information; Actors: Unintentional insider threat;
Attributes: Damage to the reputation and standings of the
enterprise and its senior employees; and Actions: Attack
Vector – UI-AV5. The challenge with this case is the difficulty
in protecting mobile devices from inadvertent compromise
and being used as a platform for other attacks (e.g., data
extraction). A core reality is that these devices often hold
very important and, even in the cases of a work device, very
personal data.
D. Insider IoT attacks of the future
Thus far, we have presented attacks largely possible with
IoT devices available today. In this section, we take a step into
the future to briefly consider attacks that may be possible in a
world where IoT devices are commonplace, and a significant
number of devices are connected. To begin, we start by
outlining some details of an IoT smart office, and introduce
the context of the attack case. Next, we present an insider
attack that could be possible in this fully connected world.
The Case: A multinational technology company has opened
its new headquarters, equipped with the latest technologies and
IoT devices. The security of the building is a top priority, given
that it is where they develop and house their most sensitive
IP. With this in mind, in addition to all the sensors that ensure
offices are eco-friendly (e.g., smart lights, displays) and highly
convenient for employees, there are several wireless cameras
and other smart devices to monitor employees. Access to
the building is granted by a two-factor authentication using
the corporate phone (NFC) and biometrics (fingerprint). No
personal property is allowed to enter to the building and people
are checked again at the exit. The company is especially
concerned about any electronic device that might be used
to steal IP. Smartphones are controlled by corporate IT, so
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pictures cannot be taken of IP without their knowledge. The
organisation has a largely in-house maintenance service that
provides cleaning services, food and smart food equipment.
Smart mugs connect via a local wireless network to coffee
machines and kettles, and are all designed to have coffee ready
for employee breaks. Smart mug warmers also keep coffee
warm and recharge the batteries of the mug.
The Attack: A product engineer, frustrated with her slow
career progress in the company, decides to steal designs for a
new technology device (IP). As part of her plan she colludes
with the smart mugs supplier to replace the mugs of the
company with very similar ones. The new mugs are identical
in appearance but they have been modified to incorporate a
new WiFi promiscuous receiver that captures WiFi packets
and stores them to the mug’s internal memory. Every few
months, the cleaners would take some of the dirty mugs off the
company premises to replace their rechargeable batteries and
bring in new ones (that have been specially cleaned); security
officers would conduct spot checks of the mug shipments
coming in, but never in great detail. The engineer had also
modified the new mugs’ battery management software to stop
some of them from charging after a few weeks, thus speeding
up the need to replace the mugs. As mugs were replaced,
the insider would collect the old mugs from the cleaners and
pay them for their help. Through this attack, the disgruntled
engineer would be able to capture WiFi communications
for many months, that then could be decrypted to discover
sensitive information and possibly IP.
VI. REFLECTIONS AND OUTLINE OF A RESEARCH AGENDA
The attacks outlined in Section V present a glimpse into the
adapted threat from insiders possible with IoT. As was hinted
in earlier sections, the real challenge with these attacks is that
current insider-threat detection approaches are generally ill-
prepared to address them. At the technical level for instance,
different devices use numerous protocols and organisations’
monitoring systems do not cater for such diversity. More-
over, collecting data on IoT devices and incorporating it into
detection systems is a significant challenge, which also has
several privacy implications. To make matters worse, many of
the attack vectors presented in Section V involve recording
data, but can be conducted without leaving any digital trace
on enterprise systems (e.g., taking a photo of sensitive IP). At
the social level, we have already witnessed companies struggle
with creating a security-aware culture with BYOD [32]; this
is likely to be significantly harder in the IoT world.
A key aspect that we re-emphasis here is that while a
number of the attack vectors identified in this article are,
in part, similar in type to BYOD attacks, there are crucial
differences which make IoT a more significant problem. The
most substantial difference is the IoT vision itself, which
involves a vast variety of devices where any ‘thing’ (a light
bulb, a tea cup, or a pair of shoes) could be connected and fully
instrumented. This fundamentally blurs enterprise boundaries
and perimeters, and is very different to any BYOD attack
setup. With IoT, it is extremely difficult for organisations
to collect, manage or assess data from devices because the
perimeters (i.e., what is internal versus external) are constantly
shifting. Our paper is grounded in current IoT devices to help
elucidate the challenges with IoT and insider threats that exist
today. In the future however, practically any device may be
used as an attack platform, as we highlighted in Section V-D;
this is the fast-approaching reality.
In what follows, we outline a broad research agenda focused
on key problems in the IoT and insider-threat space, to encour-
age more directed research in this area. Going forward, it is
imperative that organisations possess solutions, both technical
and social/cultural, to address the emerging attack vectors from
employees’ use of IoT devices. The research community will
play a critical role in this process and advances in this field.
One of the first important areas for research, is in com-
prehensively documenting and modelling IoT attack vectors,
of which we outline an initial set in this paper, to aid in
the understanding of this new threat. A central part of this
process could be the complete definition (and evaluation) of
an adapted taxonomy for insider attacks using IoT devices; this
would build on our initial work in this paper regarding Howard
and Longstaff’s [36] model. Such a taxonomy would create
a standardised foundation for modelling and threat analysis.
With this knowledge, research could then focus on extending
detection systems (e.g., [10, 24, 28]) to account for data from
IoT logs where possible, and types of attacks to monitor
for. This would also involve redesigning reasoning modules
to correlate attacks with digital activity from these devices
(likely fused with other corporate data points). The trialling
and evaluation of these defensive systems will be essential, as
given the unique nature of IoT devices, false positives could
be a significant initial hurdle.
A next potential avenue for future research is in investi-
gating the extent to which advances in MDM-type solutions
for insider-attack prevention and detection, can be adapted
to IoT. As we mentioned in Section IV, this is not a trivial
problem if only due to resource constraints on IoT devices.
Nonetheless, MDM has proved useful in managing BYOD
paradigms, especially via facilities for secure containerised
storage, data access and remote management. As such, there
is potential value in an in-depth analysis of the adaptability
of such solutions. The ideal case is that through this analysis,
unique systems could be designed and created that could work
with the limited resources on smart devices to address the
insider IoT challenge.
Another strand of research could focus on attacks which do
not leave a digital trace, and propose ways through which these
may be deterred and detected. A possible preventive solution
could explore how to design appropriate IoT policies. For
example, no unauthorised IoT devices in work meetings, or the
detection for the physically impossible (e.g., a single user au-
thenticating to internal databases from two different locations
at the same time). An initial attempt at recognising the leakage
of sensitive data with the use of IoT is presented by Choi et
al. [54]. They demonstrate how watermarking technologies
may potentially be used to deter, and subsequently identify
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the leakage of sensitive information even when insiders use
micro devices. While this is an admirable start, a substantial
amount of additional research is needed in this space if we
are to tackle this growing problem.
There are also challenges of a different nature emerging
from legal and ethical issues. We mentioned in Section III
that the effectiveness of the detection systems relies on the
datasets available. Laws are legislated to prohibit the collection
and processing of data that may impeach employees’ rights
to privacy, as we previously discussed in Nurse et al. [8].
In many countries for example, processing datasets such
as email activity would be considered a violation of data
protection legislation. These challenges are even greater in
the IoT discipline, since most of the devices are personal,
and thus ethical and legal issues apply; we covered some of
the privacy and surveillance issues in Section II. Finding a
balance between collecting and processing sensitive data to
detect insider attacks using IoT, while preserving employees’
privacy is a key challenge which will also need to be further
assessed in research and practice.
Finally, in this paper we elaborated on attacks derived from
the more personal IoT devices. There is scope however, for in-
sider attacks in cases where organisation-deployed IoT devices
support consumers and also, the critical infrastructure. From a
consumer perspective, IoT devices installed in enterprises or
homes (e.g., smart thermostats, cameras, monitoring systems
and door locks) typically share data with device manufacturers
(via a private cloud) as part of the service or for after-purchase
support. The reality is, therefore, that this data cloud (which
may store sensitive information including where people are,
their various habits or preferences) could be inappropriately
accessed by a rouge employee at the manufacturer, and used
either to invade a person’s privacy directly or as part of a larger
data breach [55]. We have already seen such privacy attacks
by employees in the past, even within enterprises such as
Google [56]. This is a significant challenge particularly when
we consider how connected offices and homes will become in
future years and the vast amount of data that will be available
to manufacturers (and third-parties) and their employees.
From a critical infrastructure perspective, there are various
other concerns as well. Smart grids for energy distributions,
smart sewers and smart dams for control flows provide unique
opportunities for attacks where the impact would have sig-
nificant effects, not only on an organisational level but on
a national and societal level as well. Fortunately, this area
has attracted a significant research emphasis over the last few
years [57, 58]. As some of those articles suggest however,
there is more to be done both in terms of research and
adoption of proposed security mechanisms, not to mention
the development of usable systems capable of reducing the
likelihood of accidental incidents [59].
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the implications that the use of IoT
devices may have on the insider-threat landscape for organisa-
tions. Research on IoT devices is still very much ‘in progress’
and the security concerns are mainly only being considered
for external attacks. This factor, coupled with the difficulties
which detection systems currently face in identifying insider
threats, provide a unique means for insiders to successfully
execute attacks using IoT devices. This article highlighted a
few salient examples of how IoT devices, especially personal
ones (e.g., smart-watches, smart-pens, smart-glasses), can be
used by insiders to conduct such attacks. We also examined
and discussed these attacks in the context of a few key case
scenarios. We believe that there is scope for the current insider-
threat detection approaches to be extended to accommodate
IoT devices, but there are several challenges to be addressed
first. Organisations need to recognise the threat at hand, and
begin to construct systems and networks capable of being
resilient to future IoT environments, where any ‘thing’ may be
an insider. Overall, we believe that this provides a fertile area
for future research to ensure that organisations are protected
from this new avenue of threat.
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